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Autism is a developmental disorder characterized by behavioral, communicative and social 
impairments. With regard to social deficits, research burgeoned when children with autism were 
found to have impaired theory of mind (ToM) abilities and difficulty attributing mental states to 
others. Although ToM has been extensively studied in individuals with autism, little is known 
regarding this population’s understanding of their own mental processes.   While researchers 
have argued that metacognition and ToM are related, few empirical studies have examined these 
two constructs together. The current study examined memory awareness, a component of 
metacognition, and its relationship to ToM in individuals with autism.  Furthermore, memory 
awareness was examined within the context of both incidental and explicit facial recognition 
tasks. Participants consisted of high-functioning children and adults with autism and control 
children and adults, matched on age, FSIQ, VIQ & PIQ. Memory awareness accuracy was 
assessed based on the accuracy of certainty judgments for each recognition trial.  Overall, 
individuals with autism had less accurate memory awareness compared to controls.  In particular, 
children with autism appear to have a less accurate understanding of their memory awareness.  
Furthermore, overall memory awareness was associated with measures of ToM. These results 
indicate that deficits in memory awareness for faces may contribute to more general social 
deficits and suggest that further research is needed to better understand metacognitive processes 
in individuals with autism.  
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
Autism, a developmental disorder characterized by behavioral, communicative and social 
impairments, has gained much attention over the past years as a result of increasing incidence 
rates and increasing public concern (American Psychiatric Association, 2000).  The majority of 
research on autism has focused on deficits within the social domain, including those relating to 
nonverbal behaviors (e.g., eye-to-eye gaze, facial expression and body posture), the quality and 
quantity of social relationships, interpersonal sharing, and social or emotional reciprocity.  
Research on social deficits in individuals with autism burgeoned when children with autism were 
found to have impaired theory of mind, or an impaired ability to attribute mental states to others 
(Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith; 1985).  Consequently, theory of mind tasks have become the 
predominant measure used to assess deficits in social cognition among individuals with autism. 
While deficits in theory of mind (ToM) are thought to explain much of the behavioral, 
communicative and social impairments observed in individuals with autism, deficits in theory of 
mind are now included more broadly in Baron Cohen’s empathizing and systematizing theory of 
autism (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Lawson & Griffin, Hill; 2002).  Although the suggested 
importance of theory of mind has been reduced, impaired theory of mind remains a common 
characteristic of individuals who have autism.  Moreover, subsequent research has shown that 
performance on theory of mind tests is associated with measures of social functioning in 
individuals with autism, suggesting that theory of mind deficits are meaningful for social 
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interactions (Frith, 1994).  Thus, competing theories, including the executive function and the 
weak central coherence accounts of autism, have been modified to explain the observed deficits 
in theory of mind (Ozonoff, South & Provencal, 2005; Happé, 2005).  
While theory of mind continues to be the focus of much research on autism, little 
research has examined the broader implications of this deficit.  In particular, researchers have not 
explored how deficits in theory of mind are related more generally to cognition.  In the early 
literature on autism, Leslie (1987) proposed that a cognitive deficit, the ability for 
metarepresentation, could explain the observed social, communication, and imagination 
impairments.  He suggested that while children with autism’s ability to create primary 
representations were intact (e.g., concept development), there was a specific deficit in 
metarepresentation.  Consistent with this, several researchers have argued that metacognition and 
theory of mind are related and therefore should be studied together, both within typically 
developing children and within children with autism (Bartsch & Estes, 1996; Flavell, 2000; 
Kuhn, 1999, 2000; Happé , 2003; Frith & Happé , 1999; Frith, 1989; Farrant, Blades & Boucher, 
2004; Farrant, Boucher & Blades, 1999).  Nevertheless, the majority of research on 
metarepresentation in individuals with autism has been limited to studies of theory of mind 
development, and few studies have examined the relationship between theory of mind and other 
metacognitive processes.  
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1.1 DEVELOPMENT OF THEORY OF MIND IN TYPICALLY DEVELOPING 
CHILDREN 
Within typically developing children, false-belief tasks are the primary measure used to assess 
theory of mind.  Although there is some variability depending on the false-belief task used, 
children around the age of 4 are able to pass these tests of theory of mind (Wimmer & Perner, 
1983).  Thus, between the ages 3 and 5, typically developing children’s performance on theory of 
mind, false-belief tasks dramatically increases.  In a meta-analysis of 178 studies looking at 
theory of mind, Wellman, Cross and Watson (2001) found a significant developmental trend, 
with a 2.94 increase in the odds-ratio of a child passing a false-belief task for every 12 months of 
age.  Thus, at 32 months of age, typically developing children were performing below chance 
(33.6%), and by 68 months of age, children were performing at ceiling.  Furthermore, this 
developmental trend did not differ based on the type of false-belief task used (e.g., change-of-
location tasks, unexpected-contents tasks, and unexpected-identity tasks), the type of protagonist 
(e.g., real person, puppet, doll, pictured character, or videotaped person), or the nature of the 
target object (e.g., real item, toy, or picture), indicating that this trend is quite robust.  In a more 
recent study, Lockl and Schneider (2007) reported a similar developmental trend. 
1.2 DEVELOPMENT OF THEORY OF MIND IN INDIVIDUALS WITH AUTISM 
In contrast to typically developing children, children with autism have been shown to be 
significantly delayed in their understanding of false-belief tasks (Pellicano, 2007).   In a review 
of 28 studies, Happé (1995) compared the performance of individuals with autism on two false-
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belief tasks to the performance of individuals with mental retardation and to the performance of 
typically developing individuals.  While individuals with autism performed significantly worse 
on average than individuals without autism, they also required a much higher verbal mental age 
in order to perform above chance (9 years, 4 years; respectively); thus, the observed deficits in 
theory of mind cannot simply be attributed to language delays which are also associated with 
autism.  Similar results were obtained in a later meta-analysis by Yirmiya and colleagues (1998).  
Researchers previously did not focus on the development of more advanced theory of 
mind since this ability develops rapidly for typically developing children.  However, since theory 
of mind deficits are thought to be vital to our understanding of autism, researchers have 
subsequently developed more advanced tests of theory of mind, including the Strange Stories test 
(Happé, 1994) and the Reading the Mind in the Eyes test (Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, & 
Robertson, 1997).  High functioning adults with autism performed worse on the Reading the 
Mind in the Eyes test and on the Strange Stories test compared to both adults without autism and 
adults with Tourettes Syndrome (Baron-Cohen et al. 1997).  Thus, while impairments in theory 
of mind are evident early in childhood, adults with autism continue to have impaired theory of 
mind.  
1.3 THEORY OF MIND AND METACOGNTION 
1.3.1 Theoretical relationship 
Metacognition can broadly be defined as one’s general knowledge regarding any aspect of 
cognitive activity, either within oneself or within others (Lockl & Schneider, 2007).  Under this 
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definition, metacognition includes the knowledge typically described as theory of mind.  
However, more specifically, metacognition can be divided into two types, metacognitive 
knowledge of cognition and metacognitive regulation of cognition (Shraw & Moshman, 1995).  
Metacognitive knowledge refers to what an individual knows generally about cognition, 
including declarative knowledge (e.g., knowledge about oneself as a learner and about factors 
that influence performance), procedural knowledge (e.g., knowledge about the execution of 
strategies or procedural skills), and conditional knowledge (e.g., knowledge concerning when 
and why to apply various cognitive processes).  In contrast, metacognitive regulation refers to 
how one actively uses metacognitive knowledge to influence cognition.  Metacognitive 
regulation includes planning (e.g., the selection of appropriate strategies and allocation of 
resources), monitoring, (e.g., one’s online awareness of comprehension and task performance), 
and evaluation (e.g., one’s assessment of what one knows).  Nevertheless, theory of mind is still 
included in this more precise definition of metacognition, along with a variety of other 
metacognitive skills.     
While few studies have looked at these to concepts together, researchers have suggested 
that theory of mind research be viewed within the theoretical framework of metacognition 
(Bartsch et al, 1996; Flavell, 2000; Kuhn, 1999, 2000).  Although theorists differ in their 
conceptualization of the relationship between theory of mind and metacognition, there is 
agreement on the idea that, “children’s developing understanding of mental states is a foundation 
achievement necessary for later metacognition and social cognition,” (Bartsch et al., 1996).   
Similar views have been espoused by autism researchers (Happé , 2003; Frith et al., 
1999; Frith, 1989; Farrant et al., 2004; Farrant et al., 1999).  Frith acknowledged that within the 
theory of mind literature, little attention has been given to a child’s awareness of self, noting that 
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“there is no reason to distinguish the ability to reflect on other people’s mental states and on our 
own.  This reflective ability is self-awareness in the case when we consider our own states of 
mind.  To know that we know and to think about our own thinking are accomplishments that 
presuppose higher order processing ability,” (Frith, 1989).  Thus, theorists have argued that 
theory of mind and metacognition should be studied together in order to improve our 
understanding of both typical and atypical cognitive development.  
1.3.2 Empirical evidence 
While the relationship between theory of mind and metacognition is largely conceptually based, 
there is some empirical support for this relationship in individuals without autism.  Research on 
typically developing children has shown that reasoning about oneself is similar to reasoning 
about others on false-belief tasks, as performance on self questions is highly correlated with 
performance on other questions (Wellman et al. 2001; Gopnik & Astington, 1998).  More direct 
evidence is provided by a longitudinal study by Lockl and Schneider (2007).  Children’s theory 
of mind was evaluated annually from age 3 to age 5.  In addition, their metamemory, 
specifically, their understanding of factors that influence memory performance (i.e., declarative 
knowledge), was assessed at age 5.  At each age, performance on theory of mind was 
significantly associated with performance on metamemory questions, even after controlling for 
language.  Moreover, a child’s theory of mind performance at 3 years of age accounted for 13% 
of the variance in later metamemory performance and 27% of the variance at 4 years of age.  
While this study found a relationship between theory of mind and declarative knowledge about 
memory, it is unclear whether other metacognitive processes are also associated with theory of 
mind.  
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Research on the relationship between metacognition and theory of mind is similarly 
scarce with regard to individuals with autism (Farrant et al., 2004; Farrant et al., 1999).  In one 
study, Farrant, Blades and Boucher (1999) examined recall readiness in children with autism.  
Recall readiness refers to the ability to monitor learning and judge when information has been 
sufficiently learned so that it can be later recalled.  Children with autism performed worse on the 
recall readiness task, indicating that they have trouble monitoring and evaluating their own 
memory.  Although this study did not assess theory of mind, it does provide evidence that 
metacognition is more generally impaired in individuals with autism.   In contrast, a later study 
by Farrant and colleagues (2004) examined theory of mind and metamemory, including 
knowledge about variables which influence memory, knowledge about memory strategies, and 
knowledge about another person’s memory.  They also studied the influence of categories on 
memory recall.  Contrary to their hypotheses, children with autism did not differ from controls in 
their knowledge about memory, although there were qualitative differences in the types of 
memory strategies they reported.  In addition, no relationship was found between performance 
on false-belief tasks and performance on metamemory measures.  
Thus, while research on typically developing children offers some support for a 
relationship between theory of mind and metacognition, the limited research on individuals with 
autism is more ambiguous.  Although the results of the two studies on children with autism are 
inconsistent, the two studies also examined different components of metacognition.  As a result, 
these conflicting findings may simply reflect the diversity within metacognition.  In the earlier 
study, recall readiness, which requires monitoring and evaluating, components of metacognitive 
regulation, was measured (Farrant et al., 1999).  In contrast, the second study primarily assessed 
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declarative knowledge (e.g., factors which affect memory) and procedural knowledge (e.g. 
identification of strategies), aspects of metacognitive knowledge (Farrant et al., 2004).   
In addition to differences among the specific components of metacognition assessed, 
there are also more general differences between metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive 
regulation which could have contributed to these inconsistent results. While nonspecific rules 
and accumulated knowledge can be used on tests of metacognitive knowledge, these types of 
information are substantially less useful on tests of metacognitive regulation.  For example, when 
enumerating strategies to improve memory, one can use general rules which have been learned 
or explicitly taught regarding what do when you forget.  In contrast, when evaluating the extent 
to which information has been memorized, one must actively track one’s memory since the 
evaluation is unique to the situation.  Thus, specific differences in the metacognitive process 
assessed and more general differences between metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive 
regulation may help explain why conflicting results were found for individuals with autism.  
Given the variability within metacognition, it is likely that not all metacognitive 
processes are related to theory of mind.  Therefore, it is important to consider specific 
metacognitive processes, which at least conceptually, are most closely related to ToM: 
metacognitive monitoring and evaluating.  These two components of metacognitive regulation 
parallel the on-line monitoring of another person’s mental state and the subsequent evaluation of 
that person’s mental state which are necessary to pass tests of ToM.  Thus, within the domain of 
metamemory, memory awareness or the online monitoring and evaluating of memory may be 
more strongly associated with theory of mind attributions.  
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1.4 MEMORY AWARENSS IN TYPICALLY DEVELOPING INDIVIDUALS 
Within typically developing children, memory awareness is usually deduced by comparing 
confidence judgments to actual performance.  The accuracy of the confidence judgment, or the 
accuracy of the memory awareness, is indicated by the degree to which reported confidence 
corresponds with actual performance.  In one of the earliest studies to look at memory awareness 
in children, Berch and Evans (1973) examined the accuracy of confidence judgments in both 
kindergarten and third grade children.  Children as young as 5 1/2 were able to use the 4 level 
confidence rating scale, and more importantly, confidence ratings of children in both grades 
reflected the accuracy of their memory recall.  However, confidence judgments were 
significantly more accurate for children in third grade.  Research has shown that memory 
awareness accuracy continues to improve with development (Allwood, Granhag & Jonsson, 
2006; Pressley, Ghatala & Ahmad, 1987; Roebers, Gelhaar & Schneider, 2004; Roebers & 
Howie, 2003;  Roebers, 2002).  In a study of 11 to 12 year old children and adults, Allwood and 
colleagues (2006) found further evidence that memory awareness accuracy improves with age. 
On average, children’s reported feelings of confidence on the memory test were 22% higher than 
their actual accuracy; in contrast, adults’ reported feelings of confidence were only 12% higher 
than their actual accuracy.  Thus by adulthood, typically developing individuals have developed 
highly accurate memory awareness. 
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1.5 THE CURRENT STUDY 
Although the development of theory of mind has been extensively studied within individuals 
with autism, little is known regarding this population’s understanding of their own mental 
processes (Happé, 1995; Yirmiya et al., 1998).  While there are similarities between theory of 
mind and metacognition, few studies have examined whether broader deficits in metacognition 
exist in individuals with autism.  Moreover, because there is substantial variability within 
metacognition, research on memory awareness may be especially informative since memory 
awareness requires metacognitive processes which appear similar to those required in tests of 
theory of mind.  Currently, it is not known whether metacognitive monitoring and evaluating, as 
measured by memory awareness, must develop with regard to one’s own mental states before 
these processes can be applied to the mental states of others as in theory of mind judgments.  
Thus, research on memory awareness in individuals with autism is needed to better understand 
metacognition within this population and to clarify the nature of deficits in theory of mind. 
An important application of memory awareness is in the domain of face recognition.  
While there is ample research suggesting that individuals with autism have difficulty processing 
faces (Hauck, Fein, Maltby, Waterhouse, & Feinstein,1998; Rouse, Donnelly & Hadwin, 2004) 
and that this difficulty continues into adulthood (Blair, Frith & Smith, 2002; Molesworth, 
Bowler, & Hampton, 2005; Williams, Goldstein & Minshew, 2005), it is unknown whether 
individuals with autism are aware of this deficit.   A benefit of studying memory awareness 
within face recognition is that it is a task which has real life analogs, as one is frequently 
expected to remember what acquaintances look like.  In addition, it is a skill which individuals 
regularly receive feedback on, as others provide either validation or invalidation through the way 
they respond.  Furthermore, metacognitive impairments within this domain would have 
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substantial repercussions for social interactions.  Without accurate memory awareness for faces, 
one might falsely identify strangers as friends, or friends as strangers, causing confusing and 
potentially negative social experiences.  Alternatively, accurate memory awareness of one’s 
impaired ability to recognize faces would allow for compensatory strategies.  Thus, while 
memory awareness is generally important for learning, it has additional implications within the 
domain of face recognition. 
For these reasons, the current study examined memory awareness accuracy and its 
relationship to theory of mind in children and adults with autism on a face recognition task.   
Consistent with prior research, memory awareness was assessed using confidence judgments, 
which accurately reflect one’s memory in typically developing children as young as 5 1/2 (Berch 
et al., 1973).   Memory awareness accuracy was evaluated separately for each certainty level 
within the confidence judgments.   An overall measure of memory awareness was also used to 
describe how memory awareness accuracy varies with certainty.  In addition, memory awareness 
accuracy was assessed for both an explicit memory test, in which participants were aware of the 
pending memory assessment, and an incidental memory test, in which participants were 
surprised with a memory assessment.  These two conditions were included to provide a 
multifaceted assessment of memory awareness since the degree to which memory awareness is 
impaired may very depending on type of memory assessed.  Though speculative, it was purposed 
that the explicit condition would indicate optimal memory awareness since participants were 
purposefully trying to remember the faces and that the incidental condition would indicate basal 
memory awareness since participants were not actively trying to remember the faces.   
Thus, the primary goal of the current study was to examine memory awareness accuracy 
in children and adults with autism and more specifically, to describe how the accuracy of 
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confidence judgments differs compared to children and adults in the control condition.  
Substantial evidence indicates that theory of mind is impaired in individuals with autism; 
however, impairments in theory of mind may reflect more general impairments in metacognitive 
monitoring and evaluating.  Additionally, this study explored how memory awareness accuracy 
varies between children and adults.  Prior research indicates that memory awareness in 
individuals without autism improves with age, thus the degree to which memory awareness is 
impaired in individuals with autism may also vary for children and adults.  Furthermore, this 
study was designed to examine how the type of recognition test affects memory awareness and to 
describe the relationship between theory of mind and memory awareness in individuals with 
autism.  While the experimental condition (i.e., recognition test type) provides a 
multidimensional assessment of memory awareness in individuals with autism, the association 
between theory of mind and overall memory awareness clarifies the nature of deficits in 
metacognitive monitoring and evaluating.  
Based on the literature reviewed above, it was predicted that individuals with autism 
would have impaired memory awareness, as indicated by reduced memory awareness accuracy, 
compared to individuals without autism.  More specifically, it was expected that individuals with 
autism would report less accurate confidence judgments compared to individuals without autism.  
It was also hypothesized that individuals with autism would have more accurate memory 
awareness for the explicit compared to the incidental condition.  However, for individuals 
without autism, the accuracy of confidence judgments would not vary depending on the type of 
facial recognition test.  Lastly, it was hypothesized that overall memory awareness would be 
positively associated with theory of mind in individuals with autism.  Thus, changes in memory 
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awareness accuracy across certainty levels would be associated with one’s performance on 
measures of theory of mind.   
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2.0  METHOD 
2.1 PARTICIPANTS 
Participants included both children and adults.  Child participants consisted of 47 high-
functioning children with autism and 37 typically developing, control children who ranged in age 
from 9 to 17 years old. For children, both the autism group and the control group included 5 
female participants.   Adult participants included 31 high-functioning adults with autism and 28 
control adults who ranged in age from 18 to 45 years old.  For adults, the autism group included 
2 female participants, whereas the control group included 4 female participants. Within the entire 
sample, 96.5% of participants were Caucasian, 2.8% were African American, and .7% were 
Asian Americans.  Control participants in each age group were matched with participants in the 
autism group on age, full scale IQ, verbal IQ, and performance IQ (see Table 1).  For both 
children and adults, no significant differences existed between the autism group and the control 
group for any demographic variable.   
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Table 1.  Demographic characteristics of autism and control groups   
  Child  Adults 
 Controls (n=37) Autism (n=47)  Controls (n=28) Autism (n=31) 
Age 13.11 (2.32) 12.10(2.67)  25.01(7.23) 25.81(7.85) 
VIQ  106.60(8.40) 103.75(10.65)  108.01(8.94) 103.39(13.23) 
PIQ 107.22(8.05) 110.43(10.72)  112.11(13.8) 109.20(10.52) 
FSIQ 108.01(8.22) 107.92(9.77)  111.29(8.29) 107.30(10.94) 
Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent standard deviations.  
VIQ=Verbal IQ; PIQ=Performance IQ; FSIQ=Full-Scale IQ. 
Age is indicated in years. 
 
 
 
Participants were recruited through posters, newspaper, radio, and television 
advertisements.  For the autism group, participants’ diagnoses were confirmed using the Autism 
Diagnostic Observation Schedule-General (ADOS-G; Lord et al., 1989), the Autism Diagnostic 
Interview-Revised (ADI-R; Lord, Rutter, & LeCouteur, 1994) and clinical opinion.  Participants 
with Asperger’s disorder or PDD-NOS were excluded. Control participants were volunteers 
recruited from the community.  Parents of potential control participants completed questionnaires 
with demographic and family information to determine eligibility.  Control participants were 
required to have a negative family history of first degree relatives with major psychiatric 
disorders and of first and second degree relatives with autism spectrum disorder.  Control 
participants were also excluded if they had a history of poor school attendance or evidence of a 
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disparity between general level of ability and academic achievement suggesting a learning 
disability.  The Wide Range Achievement Test-IV was administered to all participants to exclude 
participants with a diagnosable learning disability.  All participants were also required to be in 
good medical health, free of seizures, have a negative history of traumatic brain injury, and have 
an IQ greater than 80 as determined by the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI; 
Wechsler, 1999). 
2.2 APPARATUS 
Testing occurred in a quiet room.  Each participant sat in front of a 43-cm. monitor controlled by 
a computer and responded using a modified keyboard with large keys (approximately 2.54 cm. 
squares) that is commercially available for young children.  During the recognition test, all keys 
were covered with black felt except for the two response keys labeled “old” and “new”.  The 
position (left/right) of the “old” and “new” labels was counterbalanced. 
2.3 STIMULI 
Stimuli during the learning phase consisted of 24 color photographs of adult female faces.  
During the memory test, stimuli consisted of 48 color photographs of adult female faces, 24 
which were included during the learning phase (old), and 24 which were not included during the 
learning phase (new).  For all stimuli, non-facial cues, (i.e.; as an individual’s hair style and 
clothing) were occluded.   In both the explicit condition and the incidental condition, each 
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stimulus during the learning phase was presented for 5 seconds, and was then followed by a 
black screen for 4 seconds.  For both the learning phase and the memory test, stimuli order was 
randomized. 
2.4 STANDARDIZED MEASURES OF THEORY OF MIND 
Theory of mind was measured using false-belief tasks and the Strange Stories test. 
2.4.1 False-belief tasks (1st and 2nd order beliefs)   
For this study, three standard false-belief tests were used: the Sally-Ann task (with props) 
(Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985), the John-Mary task (with props) (Baron-Cohen et al., 
1985; Bowler, 1992) and the Peter-Jane task (without props) (Bowler, 1992).  The Sally-Ann 
task involved a change of location format and evaluates the participant’s ability to make first-
order belief attributions (e.g., Where will Sally look to find x?).  In contrast, both the John-Mary 
and the Peter-Jane tasks used a change of location format to evaluate the participant’s ability to 
make both first-order and second-order belief attributions, in which the participant must 
understand one person's belief about what another person believes about reality (e.g., What does 
John think Mary thinks?). 
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2.4.2 Strange Stories test 
This test provided an assessment of more advanced theory of mind abilities (Happé, 1994).  
During the test, participants were asked to read short stories about everyday situations which are 
followed by written questions about the story characters’ motivation.   
2.5 PROCEDURE 
At the initial visit, all participants were administered the three false-belief tasks and the Strange 
Stories test.  At this time, participants were randomly assigned to either the explicit memory 
condition or the incidental memory condition.  At a second visit, participants were tested on their 
facial recognition and their memory awareness.  Procedures varied based on the experimental 
condition to which participants were assigned. 
2.5.1 Explicit memory condition 
Prior to the learning phase, participants in the explicit condition were told that they were going to 
view a presentation of faces.  Participants were told to pay attention because immediately 
following the presentation their memory for the faces would be tested.  Following the learning 
phase, participants were then tested on their recognition of the faces they had just seen.  
Participants were asked to push the key labeled “old” if they remembered seeing the face in the 
previous presentation and to push the key labeled “new” if they did not remember seeing the face 
in the previous presentation.  For each test trial, participants were also asked to make a 
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confidence judgment by indicating their certainty for their response using a 3 point Likert scale 
consisting of “certain” “somewhat certain” and “guessing.” 
2.5.2 Incidental memory condition 
Prior to the learning phase, participants in the incidental condition were told that they were going 
to view a presentation of faces.  Participants were told to pay attention because they would need 
to say whether they thought each face was “attractive”, “average”, or “unattractive”.  Following 
the learning phase, participants were immediately given a surprise memory test.  The procedures 
for the memory test and confidence judgments were identical to that in the explicit condition. 
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3.0  RESULTS 
The primary data analyses were designed to assess specific hypotheses regarding:  1) how 
memory awareness accuracy in individuals with autism differs from that in individuals without 
autism, 2) how memory awareness accuracy changes with age group, 3) how memory awareness 
accuracy differs on tests of explicit memory compared to tests of incidental memory, and 4) how 
memory awareness relates to theory of mind.  In the following sections, we first examine the 
impact of diagnosis, age group, and experimental condition on memory awareness accuracy.  We 
then explore the relationship between overall memory awareness and theory of mind in 
individuals with autism.  
 
3.1 MEMORY AWARENESS ACCURACY 
For each participant, memory awareness accuracy was calculated for each certainty rating (sure, 
somewhat sure, and guessing) by dividing the number of correct trials for a given certainty level 
by the overall number of trials a participant reported a given certainty level.  Thus, accuracy 
percentages reflect the percentage of correct recognition trials when the participant said they 
were a particular certainty level. 
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A four-way ANOVA was conducted with diagnosis (control vs. autism), age group (child 
vs. adult) and experimental condition (explicit vs. incidental) as between-subjects variables, 
certainty (certain vs. somewhat certain vs. guessing) as a repeated, within-subjects variable, and 
memory awareness accuracy as the dependent measure.  Preliminary analysis indicated that there 
was a violation of the assumption of sphericity.  As a result, a Huynh-Feldt correction was 
employed in subsequent analyses.    
Results indicated a significant main effect of diagnosis, F(1, 127)=15.49, p<.001, with 
individuals with autism reporting less accurate memory awareness overall compared to controls 
(see Figure 1).  There was also a significant main effect of certainty, F(1.65, 127)=79.06, p<.001.  
This suggests that in general, memory awareness accuracy varied depending on one’s certainty 
level, with increased accuracy reflecting greater certainty.  Results did not indicate a significant 
main effect of age group, F(1, 127)=1.76, p>.05 or a significant main effect of experimental 
condition, F(1, 125)=1.03, p>.05.  Most importantly, there was a significant Diagnosis x Age 
Group X Certainty interaction, F(1.65, 127)=4.67, p=.015 and a marginally significant Diagnosis 
x Experimental Condition X Certainty interaction, F(1.65, 125)=3.19, p=.053.   
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Figure 1. Effects of certainty level and diagnosis on memory awareness accuracy 
 
3.1.1 Effect of age group on certainty and diagnosis 
In order to explore the 3-way interaction between diagnosis, age group, and certainty 
with regard to memory awareness accuracy, 2-way ANOVAs were performed separately for 
children and adults.  For both analyses, diagnosis was included as a within-subjects variable, and 
certainty was included as a repeated, between-subjects measure.  
For child participants, there was significant main effect of diagnosis, F(1, 76)=11.80, 
p=.001 and a significant main effect of certainty F(1.67, 76 )= 27.65, p<.001.  More importantly, 
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there was a significant Diagnosis X Certainty interaction, F(1.67, 76)=12.85, p<.001.  Thus, 
while children with autism demonstrated less accurate memory awareness in general, their 
accuracy was also differentially affected by their certainty level when compared to typically 
developing children. The interaction between diagnosis and certainty is shown in Figure 2.  
Additional analyses were conducted to explore the relationship between diagnosis and certainty. 
In subsequent analyses, Šidák-Bonferroni corrections were used account for multiple 
comparisons.   
 
 
Figure 2.  Effects of certainty level and diagnosis on memory awareness accuracy in 
children 
Paired t-tests were conducted to determine if memory awareness accuracy differed 
significantly between certainty levels.  Among typically developing children, memory awareness 
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accuracy when children were certain was significantly different than when they were somewhat 
certain, and memory awareness accuracy when they were somewhat certain was significantly 
different than when they were guessing (t(35)=6.42, p<.01; t(35)=4.35, p<.01, respectively).  In 
addition, t-tests were used to determine whether memory awareness accuracy levels for certain, 
somewhat certain, and guessing were significantly better than chance (50%).  One would expect 
that if the relationship between memory awareness accuracy and certainty is meaningful, then 
accuracy levels both when certain and when somewhat certain would be statistically better than 
chance, whereas, accuracy when guessing would be random and therefore no different than 
chance.  For children in the control condition, memory awareness accuracy was significantly 
better than chance both when certain and when somewhat certain (see Table 2).  Thus, typically 
developing children were using all three certainty levels in a meaningful way.  These results 
suggest that each certainty level was both discrete and statistically meaningful for typically 
developing children.  In contrast, for children with autism, differences in accuracy between 
certainty levels were not significant.  Furthermore, children with autism performed better than 
chance only when they were certain (t(44)=4.51, p<.01; see Figure 1).  Thus, children with 
autism, unlike typically developing children, appear to have a rudimentary awareness of their 
memory, as only accuracy when certain was significantly better than chance.  Moreover, these 
results suggest that they are not able to reliably distinguish between certainty levels.   
 
Within adult participants, the 2-way ANOVA indicated a significant main effect for both 
diagnosis, F(1, 52)=9.164, p<.01 and certainty F(1.34, 52)= 54.396, p<.01.  The interaction 
between Diagnosis X Certainty was nonsignificant, F(1.34, 52 )=.171, p>.05.  While adults with 
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autism were still less accurate than adults in the control condition, their accuracy was similarly 
affected by their certainty level (see Figure 3).   
 
Figure 3.  Effects of certainty level and diagnosis on memory awareness accuracy in 
adults 
 
In order to clarify the effects of certainty, additional analyses which employed Šidák-
Bonferroni corrections were conducted. As in previous analyses, paired t-tests indicated that 
memory awareness accuracy was significantly better when certain compared to somewhat certain 
and when somewhat certain compared to guessing for both adults with autism (t(30)=3.60, 
p<.01; t(30)= 4.12, p<.01, respectively) and adults without autism (t(25)=5.23, p<.01; t(25)= 
3.47, p<.01, respectively).  These results indicate that when adult participants in both groups 
were more certain, their memory awareness accuracy for faces improved.  In addition, t-tests 
were used to examine whether memory awareness accuracy levels were significantly different 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Autism Control
Certain
Somewhat Certain
Guessing
Diagnosis
M
em
o
ry
 A
w
ar
en
es
s 
A
cc
u
ra
cy
  26 
than chance.  As shown in Table 2, accuracy when certain and accuracy when somewhat certain 
were significantly better than chance for both adults with autism and adults in the control 
condition.  Thus, for all adult participants, accuracy was uniquely and meaningfully moderated 
by certainty level.  
 
Table 2.  Significance of mean memory awareness accuracy compared to chance 
  Autistic  Control 
Certainty Level  Child (df=42) Adult (df=30)  Child (df=35) Adult (df=25) 
Certain  59.0% (14.4)* 72.8% (22.6)**  83.5% (12.4)** 87.2% (19.3)** 
Somewhat  54.1% (18.7) 58.9% (15.6)*  65.6% (13.8)** 68.6% (14.2)** 
Guessing  51.3% (27.2) 34.1% (32.2)  41.0% (30.8) 44.7%  (37.8) 
Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent standard deviations.  
* p <.05.  ** p <.01.  
 
 
 
In summary, memory awareness for younger participants with autism was significantly 
less accurate than controls.  In addition, children with autism did not distinguish between the 
three levels of certainty.  Thus, when children with autism reported they were certain, their 
memory awareness accuracy was not significantly different than when they reported they were 
guessing.  In comparison, adults with autism were able to distinguish between each of the three 
levels of certainty; however, their memory awareness accuracy was still worse than adult 
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controls.  In contrast, typically developing children’s accuracy varied significantly between each 
certainty level, suggesting that their accuracy was modulated by their degree of certainty.  For 
control children, their use of the certainty levels was also meaningful, with their accuracy being 
significantly better than chance for both certain and somewhat certain.  Similar results were 
obtained for control adults, suggesting that typically developing children are performing at adult 
levels with regard to their memory awareness accuracy. 
3.1.2 Effect of diagnosis on experimental condition and certainty 
In order to explore the 3-way interaction between diagnosis, experimental condition, and 
certainty with regard to memory awareness accuracy, 2-way ANOVAs were performed 
separately for participants with autism and for participants in the control group.  In both 
analyses, experimental condition was included as a within-subjects variable and certainty was 
included as a repeated, between-subjects measure. 
Within control participants, there was significant main effect of experimental condition, 
F(1, 60)=9.10, p=.004, and a significant main effect of certainty F(1.45, 60 )= 67.11, p<.001. 
Thus, control participants on average performed significantly better on the incidental condition 
(M=70.7%, SD=13.1%) compared the explicit condition (M=59.7%, SD=15.6%).  In addition, 
there was a significant Experimental Condition X Certainty interaction, F(1.45, 60)=4.94, 
p=.017.   As show in Figure 4, the impact of study condition differed depending on the certainty 
level for control participants.  One-way ANOVAs were conducted for each certainty level to 
examine the interaction between study and certainty.   A significant difference in accuracy 
between incidental and explicit conditions was found only when control participants were 
guessing (F(1, 60)=9.04, p=.004).  However, a t-test revealed that accuracy when guessing in the 
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incidental condition was not significantly different than chance, suggesting that this difference is 
not meaningful (t(33)=.99, p>.05). 
 
Figure 4.  Effects of certainty level and experimental condition on memory awareness 
accuracy in control participants 
Within participants with autism, the 2-way ANOVA yielded a significant main effect of 
certainty F(1.65, 71)= 17.58, p<.001.  However, the effect of experimental condition was 
nonsignificant, F(1, 71)=1.405, p>.05, suggesting that for individuals with autism, memory 
awareness accuracy was not affected by  experimental condition.  Unlike control participants, 
there was not a significant Experimental Condition X Certainty interaction, F(1.65, 71)=.285, 
p>.05.  As can be seen in Figure 5, individuals with autism performed similarly at each certainty 
level regardless of study condition.   
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In summary, memory awareness accuracy varied based on condition in control 
participants but not in participants with autism.  Among control participants, memory awareness 
was more accurate for the incidental condition compared to the explicit condition.  This indicates 
that they were more aware of their memory when they were surprised with a memory test 
compared to when they were actively trying to remember the faces.  Although this finding was 
especially pronounced when control participants were guessing, their accuracy was not 
significantly different than chance which suggests that the interaction between study and 
certainty was not meaningful. 
   
 
Figure 5.  Effects of certainty level and experimental condition on memory awareness 
accuracy in participants with autism 
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3.2 OVERALL MEMORY AWARENESS AND THEORY OF MIND 
Change in memory awareness accuracy across certainty levels was used to assess overall 
memory awareness.  Difference scores were created by subtracting memory awareness accuracy 
when guessing from accuracy when certain.  As a result, difference scores provide an index of 
the degree to which accuracy changed depending on one’s certainty level.  For example, an 
individual whose accuracy increased with increased certainty would suggest good memory 
awareness.  In contrast, a participant who performed accurately on 80% of the trials both when 
they were certain and when they were guessing would suggest that the individual was good at 
recognizing faces but had poor memory awareness.  Similarly, a participant who performed 
accurately on 50% of the trails both when they were certain and when they were guessing would 
suggest that the individual was poor at recognizing faces and also poor with regard to memory 
awareness.  Thus, difference scores were created for each participant based on the change in 
accuracy when a participant reported they were certain compared to when they were guessing.   
Initially, correlations were calculated to explore the relationship between FSIQ, age, 
performance on theory of mind false-belief tests, performance on Happé’s Strange Stories test 
and overall memory awareness.  Age (r=.335, p=.004) and performance on theory of mind false-
belief tests (r=.325, p=.011) were both associated with overall memory awareness among 
individuals with autism.  In contrast, neither FSIQ (r=-.074, p=.532) nor performance on 
Happé’s Strange Stories(r=.099, p=.46) were significantly associated with overall memory 
awareness.  As a result, a regression analysis was run with age and performance on theory of 
mind false-belief tests as independent variables and overall memory awareness as the dependent 
measure.  Age was entered in Step 1 of the regression and performance on theory of mind false-
belief tests was entered in Step 2. 
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Analysis of Step 1 indicated that age alone accounted for 11.2% of the variance in overall 
memory awareness for individuals with autism, F(1,60)=8.70, p=.005.  When performance on 
theory of mind false-belief tests was added, the model explained 16% of the variance in overall 
memory awareness for individuals with autism, F(2,59)=6.83, p=.002.  Furthermore, the addition 
of performance on theory of mind false-belief tests significantly improved the predictive value of 
the model, ∆R2=.06, Finc(1,59)=4.46, p=.039.  Among individuals with autism, a one year 
increase in age was associated with 1.2 % change in overall memory awareness.  Furthermore, 
for every 10% increase in performance on the theory of mind false-belief tests, memory 
awareness increased 4.8 %.  Thus, increases in both age and performance on theory of mind on 
false-belief tests were found to be associated with increased change in overall memory 
awareness in individuals with autism.  In contrast, FSIQ and performance on Happé’s Strange 
Stories were not associated with memory awareness. 
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4.0  DISCUSSION 
The primary objective of the current study was to describe memory awareness in individuals 
with autism compared to that in individuals without autism.  Based on the theoretical relationship 
between ToM and metacognition, it was hypothesized that individuals with autism would also 
have impaired (i.e. less accurate) memory awareness compared to individuals without autism.  
Consistent with this hypothesis, both children and adults with autism demonstrated less accurate 
memory awareness compared to respective control groups.  While no hypotheses were made 
regarding the development of memory awareness with age, age did influence memory awareness 
accuracy among individuals with autism.  The current study suggests that children with autism 
have poor memory awareness and that their memory awareness is significantly worse than 
typically developing children.  For children with autism, memory awareness accuracy did not 
consistently vary with their stated certainty levels.  Furthermore, on trials in which children with 
autism were somewhat certain, their accuracy was not significantly different from chance.  Thus, 
children with autism appear to have a very basic awareness of their memory.  In contrast, 
previous research has indicated that typically developing children as young as five and a half can 
reliably assess whether they are certain, somewhat certain or guessing (Berch et al., 1973).  The 
current study provides additional support, as typically developing children’s certainty levels 
accurately and uniquely reflected their performance on the facial recognition task.   
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Among adults with autism, increasing certainty was associated with increasing accuracy.  
Furthermore, memory awareness accuracy for each certainty level was distinct from the 
accuracies of the other two certainty levels.  This indicates that among adults with autism, there 
were meaningful differences in performance based on their stated certainty.  However, while 
memory awareness improved in adults with autism, their performance remained significantly less 
accurate than adults without autism.  Indeed, memory awareness of adults with autism was even 
less accurate than that of typically developing children, suggesting that memory awareness in 
individuals with autism is both delayed, and impaired.  
An additional purpose of this study was to examine whether testing participants with an 
explicit or implicit memory design would influence memory awareness.  Specifically it was 
hypothesized that individual with autism would have more accurate memory awareness for an 
explicit facial recognition task compared to an incidental facial recognition task.  Contrary to this 
hypothesis, memory awareness in typically developing individuals, but not in individuals with 
autism, was influenced by the experimental condition.  It was also hypothesized that knowing 
there would be a memory test, as in the explicit condition, would enhance memory awareness 
during the actually memory test.  However, in the present study,  memory awareness in typically 
developing individuals was less accurate in the explicit condition, in which participants were 
instructed to memorize the faces, compared to the incidental condition, in which participants 
were instructed to rate the faces on attractiveness.  While speculative, this decreased accuracy in 
the explicit condition may be the result of control participants strategically trying to remember 
the faces.  While knowledge regarding the recognition test may promote metacognitive planning, 
such as strategies for remembering faces, such knowledge could decrease the accuracy of one’s 
memory awareness.  For example, typically developing individuals may have focused more on 
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specific facial features, increasing the amount of attention to the faces or the amount of 
information memorized, both of which could interfere with one’s memory awareness.  
Alternatively, it is possible that making an attribution about a face, as in the incidental condition, 
may have increased the saliently of one’s memory for the faces by creating an additional 
dimension by which to gauge memory awareness.   
Lastly, the current study explored the relationship between theory of mind and memory 
awareness in individuals with autism.  Theory of mind was found to be related to memory 
accuracy awareness on the theory of mind false belief task.  In contrast this association was not 
found for the Happé’s Strange Stories tests.  These discrepant results may reflect differences in 
the two measures of theory of mind.  While both tests are presumed to measure theory of mind, 
the two tests assess theory of mind at different developmental levels and subsequently, at 
different difficulty levels.  As a result, these differences may moderate the relationship between 
theory of mind and memory awareness.  For example, memory awareness in individuals with 
autism may be related to a more basic understanding of mental states and therefore independent 
of more advanced theory of mind knowledge.  Indeed, the one study which looked at this 
relationship in typically developing children focused only on basic tests of theory of mind.  Thus, 
metacognitive knowledge about oneself and about others may initially be very similar. However, 
as one develops more advanced metacognitive knowledge about oneself and about others, these 
two types of knowledge may diverge, becoming less and less similar. Unfortunately, very few 
studies have examined the relationship between theory of mind and metacognition, so any 
interpretation must be speculative.  Furthermore, theory of mind only accounted for a fraction of 
the variance in memory awareness, suggesting that additional factors are important.    
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Together, these results have important implications for how we conceptualize specific 
impairments, as well as our general understanding of autism.  Deficits in memory awareness for 
faces may contribute to more general deficits in social interactions.  While there are many 
barriers that a child with autism must overcome in order to be successful in social interactions, 
accurately assessing one’s recognition of faces is key.  In this study, even when children with 
autism were certain that they remembered a face or didn’t remember a face, their accuracy was 
only 59%, a level which is only marginally better than chance.  As a result, children with autism 
may ignore some acquaintances, and conversely, approach strangers as if they know them.  Both 
of these possibilities would have detrimental implications, either by reducing possible social 
interactions and slighting peers, or by evoking negative responses from strangers.  Furthermore, 
decreased awareness of this impairment in facial recognition makes it unlikely that individuals 
with autism will spontaneously employ strategies to compensate for this impairment.     
While it is unclear whether impaired memory awareness in individuals with autism 
reflects a general impairment in metacognitive monitoring, additional research is warranted.  
Since the current study examined memory awareness within the context of facial recognition, it 
is possible that the observed impairments in memory awareness are specific to facial recognition. 
However, the association between performance on theory of mind, false-belief tests and memory 
awareness suggests that this impairment may apply more broadly to metacognitive monitoring of 
social information.  If this is the case, metacognitive skills may need to be developed before new 
skills can be incorporated into daily life.  For example, even if you develop strategies to increase 
your memory for faces, you must recognize situations in which you need to use them.  While 
these results are inconclusive regarding the specificity of this deficit in memory awareness, it is 
important that researchers consider the possibility that individuals with autism may have a 
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general impairment in metacognitive monitoring.  While there is a plethora of research on theory 
of mind development in autism, a general impairment in metacognitive monitoring could 
underlie these findings.  Understanding how deficits in theory of mind relate to metacognitive 
monitoring is critical since many theorists view deficits in theory of mind as a core feature of 
autism.    
Several limitations are important when considering these results.  While this study 
examined how memory awareness changes with age, only two age groups were tested.  Since 
children were combined with adolescents, it is not clear whether memory awareness accuracy in 
individuals with autism improves significantly prior to adulthood.  Exclusion of children younger 
than 9 is an additional limitation of this study.  Consequently, the age at when typically 
developing children achieve memory awareness as accurate as adults is not known.  
Furthermore, the age range studied made it impossible to examine the relationship between 
theory of mind and memory awareness in typically developing participants since their 
performance on tests of theory of mind would have been at ceiling.  As a result, it is unclear 
whether a similar relationship between theory of mind and memory awareness exists for 
typically developing individuals.  Another limitation of the current study is that memory 
awareness was examined only within the context of facial recognition.  While it is important to 
understand memory awareness for faces in individuals with autism, it is unclear whether more 
general impairments in memory awareness exist.  Lastly, the 3 point certainty scale may not have 
provided sufficient precision in order to detect changes in memory awareness accuracy between 
children and adults in the control condition.  Use of more than three choices might have 
indicated that control adults, in contrast to children, have an even more finely tuned sense of 
certainty about their memory performance.  Thus, future research on memory awareness in 
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individuals with and without autism is needed to continue to clarify how accuracy changes with 
development, how the task influences performance, and how memory awareness is related to 
theory of mind.   
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